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[8. 11'. No. 17387. In Bank. June 2, 1947.J

of WILLARD E. KAY, an Incompetent Person.
WILLARD E. KAY, an Incompetent Person, etc., Petitione!', v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.,
Respondents.
Guardian and Ward - Sale of Ward's Property - Oonflrmation.-A guardian's sale is not effective until it is confirmed
by the probate court. (Prob. Court, §§ 785, 1534.)
Id.--Oertiorari.-A determination whether there is sufficient
evidence on which to base an order confirming a guardian's
, sale lies within the discretion of the probate court, and that
. determination is not reviewable on certiorari.
Oourts - Superior Oourts - Jurisdiction.-Although the procedure and jurisdiction of the superior court sitting in probate
are limited by the provisions of the Probate Code, and in that
sense "limited and special," the court is not an inferior tri... bunal of limited jurisdiction. bnt remains a court of general
jurisdiction.
Insane Per80ns-Guardianship--Sale of Property of WardOonflrmation of Sale.-The evidence supported a finding of
the probate court that a guardian's sale of the home property
of an incompetent ward was for the best interests of the
ward, where it was shown that a good price, the best obtain- I
See 13 OaI.Jur. 182; 25 Am.Jur. 84.
Dig. References: [1] Guardian and Ward, § 76(3); [2,9]
and Ward, § 90; [3] Courts, § 160; [406] Insane Persons,
; (7,8] Insane Persons, § 45; [10] Certiorari, § 26.
,,~,
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able, was bid for the house; that the ward's dnances were not
80 secure that the court could be certain of his ability to
maintain a large bouse after cessation of bis insurance disability payments on his recovery; and that the neighborhood
was unfriendly to him, 80 tbat it might be inferred that his
return thereto would be inimical to his best interests.
[6] Id.-GuardiaDship.-8ale of Propel't7 of Ward-Oon4rmation
of Sale.-On a hearing for confirmation of a guardian's sale
of the home property of an incompetent ward. the opinion of
the guardian's representative that be considered the sale to
be for the ward's best interests was, in the abaence of any
objection by the ward, properly considered by the probate
court.
[6] Id.-Guardianship-Sale of Property of Ward-Oon4rmation
of Sale.-On a hearing for oonfirmation of a guardian's sale
of the home property of an incompetent ward, tile opinion of
the guardian's representative that he considered the sale to
be for the ward's best interests was not necessarily altered
by his later statement that he would not have made an etlon
to sell the property after the filing of the ward's petition for
restoration.
[7] Id.-Guardianahip.-Beatoration to OompeteuC)'.-A discharge
of an incompetent person from a state hospital acts as a
restoration to capacity only where no guardian has been appointed. (WeIf. & Inst. Code, § 6729.)
[8] Id.-GuardiaDship - Beatoration to OompeteuC)'. - Where a
guardian has been appointed for an incompetent person, he
can be restored to capacity only by the procedure under Prob.
Code, § 1470.
[9] GuarcIiaD and Ward-Oertiorari.-The propriety of the court's
failure to grant a continuance on a hearing for contlrmation
of a guardian's sale cannot be raised in a proceeding in
certiorari to annul the order of confirmation of the sale.
[10] Oertiorari-When Writ Lies-Oontrol of Dtscretioll.-Cernorm does not lie to review matters within the discretion of
the lower court. such as 2l'anting or denying continuances.

PROCEEDING in certiorari to annul an order of con1irmation of a guardian's sale of an incompetent person',
home property. Order aftinned.
Henry oJ. Rogers and Elden C. Friel for Petitioner.
Cushing & Cushing, OnUinan, Trowbridge & Gorrill and
Fred Herrington for Respondents.

TRAYNOR, J.-In this certiorari proceeding, petitioner
Seeks annulment of an order of the probate court confirming
• ale of his home property. The sale was made while pi-
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titioner was incompetent, but he has been restored to capacity since the order of confirmation of sale. Before his
commitment he used the property both as a home and as an
'. office where be practiced as a physician.
Petitioner's guardian sold the property under the author. of section 1530 of the Probate Code: "If . . . it is for
advantage, benefit, and best interests of the estate or
",,_T'iI or of such members of his family as he is legally
to support and maintain, his guardian may sell any
his real or personal property for any of such purposes,
to authorization, confirmation or direction by the
as hereinafter provided."
[1] A guardian'S sale is not effective, however, until it
confirmed by the court. (Kier Oorp. v. Treasure Oil 00.,
Cal.App.2d 829, 842 [136 P.2d 59].) Probate Code, sec785 (see Prob. Code, § 1534) provides that "Upon hearthe court must examine into the necessity for the sale, or
advantage, benefit and interest of the estate in having
sale made, and must examine the return and witnesses in
to the sale; and if it appears to the court that good
E.I~,.,.u existed for the sale, that the sale was legally made and
conducted . . . the court shall make an order confirmsale and directing conveyances to be executed; otherit shall vacate the sale and direct another to be had, of
_ ...h".h notice must be given and the sale in all respects conas if no previous sale had taken place. . . . " The
for confirmation of sale filed by petitioner's guardian
that the sale was for his best interests and the court
~rmEId. the sale on that ground.
re1~t1'OnE!r" conceding that an order con:firming the sale of a
property is not appealable (Guardianship of Reser,
v .......a.VJ,...~u 935. 936 [135 P.2d 709]; Prob. Code, § 1630),
annulment of the order on certiorari. His position
as follows: "[I] t seems well settlel (and there apto be no case holding to the contrary) that when a
authorizes prescribed procedure, and the court acts
rmt1'Al''V to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its
arisdiictilon and certiorari will lie to correct such excesses."
f'()(Jtmtl~" v. Superior Oourt, 13 Ca1.2d 262. 269 [89 P.2d
The probate court derives its procedure anel. jurisfrom statutes and is empowered to confirm the sale
ward's property only if one of the statutory grounds is
Here there is no evidence to aupport the probate

i
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court's finding that the sale was in petitioner's best interests,
which was the alleged statutory ground for confirming the
sale. The probate court therefore exceeded its jurisdiction
and certiorari will lie to annul its order confirming the sale.
We are unable to agree with petitioner's analysis of the
issues presented by this case. The quotation from the Rodman case is not applicable to this situation. In the Rodman
case the superior court applied cash bail to the defendant's
fine instead of returning it to the bondsman as required by
the Penal Code. In the opinion this court illustrated the
meaning of the rule quoted above by citing cases in which a
lower tribunal made an award larger than that permitted
by statute or extended a litigant's time to plead for a period
in excess of the time authorized by the code. (Rodman v.
Superior Oourt, supra, at 269-270.) These acts were clearly
in excess of the prescribed statutory authority. The present
case is one in which the probate court made a finding and
issued an order in strict conformity with its statutory grant
of authority.
According to Probate Code, section 1530, the decision to
sell the ward's property must first be made by the guardian.
The sale must then be presented to the probate court for confirmation. In the proceeding for confirmation, Probate Code.
section 785, requires that the court shall confirm the sale, after
hearing and examination, "if it appears to the court that
good reason existed for the sale." [a] It is clear, therefore,
that the determination whether there was su1Bcient evidence
upon which to base the order lies within the discretion of the
probate court. That determination is not reviewable on certiorari. (Howard v. 8u.perWr Oourt, 25 Ca1.2d 784. 788
[154 P.2d 849].)
In AbeZ16ira v. District Cour"t of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280
[109 P.2d 942,132 A.L.R. 715], the rule stated in the Rodman
case was shown to rest upon a broader principle. "Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a
court in any instance, whether that power be defined by
constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or
rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine
of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, in 80 far as that
term is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by
prohibition or annulled on certiorari." (P. 921.) Before
setting forth the foregoing principle, the opinion in the
Abelleira case gave numerous examples of such excesses of
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. jurisdiction. In every case cited as illustrative, the lower
tribunal had no power to proceed in the manner attempted.
of the cases was concerned with a situation where, as
. here, the court performed the very function and made the
very finding that was intended by the statute. There is noth•
. ing in the Abelleira or Rodman cases, therefore, to suggest
certiorari will lie where the only excess of power
.'~lomp18,ineid of is the entering of an order unsupported by
court was confronted with substantially the same
in Howard v. Superior CO'Uri, 25 Ca1.2d 784 [154
849]. In that case the probate .court, acting under
&.,IIe'l~J.VU 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, vacated its previorder allowing fees for counsel. The order vacating the
was not appealable. The attorneys to whom the
were allowed sought a writ of certiorari to annul the
vacating the allowance. They contended that the court
.~lOUIld vacate an order under section 473 only on the pre.1Iim-illed statutory groun& and that a study of the record
. . "ruWLU show that the court actually vacated the order on an_ .....10.... ground. Our opinion states: "The petitioners' claim
to lack of a sufllcient affidavit of merits, inadequacy of the
_nnwn"., . of mistake, etc., and insufficiency of the proposed
Dbjleet;1oIlS to the allowance of fees, do not affect the jurisdic.
of the court to act on the petition, but merely indicate
. possibility of error in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
motion was made upon statutory grounds and, assuming
the trial court should have decided that the mistaken
of the husband and his counsel was due to their neglifailure to ascertain the facts with reference thereto, the
can be reviewed only on appeal." (P. 788.)
opinion distinguished those cases annulling orders of
courtR where the orders were not made pursuant to any
prescribed methods of procedure as defined by the
. of Civil Procedure. "Hence it should be clear that the
miiiCtaal situation of these cases is entirely different from. a
.where the court is asked to act on proper grounds and
. so act, and the claimed error is that the court abused its
.41lf8c:retiion in finding that there was a mistake or excusable
warranting relief under section 473. In other
the court sets aside its final order on a ground not
~~[)rilted or recognized by the statute, it may be acting in
of its jurisdiction, but if it does so on a ground authorU~"'UJ."'"

)
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ized by the statute, the possible insufficiency of the evidence
to support its action does not go to its jurisdiction, but is a
basis for review on appeal. So long as there is some show.
ing in support of the trial court's action, the quantum of
proof cannot be weighed on certiorari." (P. 789.)
Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that this court should
search the record to determine whether there is evidence to
support the order, on the ground that the probate court is a
court of limited jurisdiction. His theory is that a reviewing
court should treat the decrees and orders of the probate court
as though they had issued from an administrative agency and
thereby demand that there be some evidence to establish the
.
"jurisdictional fact."
It is not necessary here to determine whether or not the
finding that the sale was in petitioner's best interests would
constitute a "jurisdictional fact," as that phrase is used in
administrative board cases. [3] The probate court is not
an administrative tribunal in any sense of the term. Al.
though the procedure and jurisdiction of the superior court
sitting in probate are limited by the provisions of the Probate
Code, and in that sense "limited and special" (Texas Co. v.
Bank of America etc. Assn., 5 Cal.2d 35, 39 [53 P.2d 127]),
that court is not an inferior tribunal of limited jurisdiction.
In certain probate proceedin~ the superior court has only
the power given it by the Probate Code and no more. (MePike v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 254, 258 [30 P.2d 17].)
This does not mean that the Legislature has created a new
court. The Legislature has, in exactly the same manner,
circumscribed the jurisdiction of the superior court in many
of its other proceedings. Nevertheless it remains a court of
general jurisdiction.
The control by the Legislature over probate jurisdiction
does not, therefore, lessen the dignity of decrees and orders
of the superior court sitting on probate. " .•• the decrees
of the probate court in matters, which like these, are clearly
within its statutory grant of jurisdiction, have the same effect,
and are supported by the same presumptions on collateral
attack, as the judgments of a court of general jurisdiction."
(Estate of Ked, 15 Cal.2d 328, 335 [100 P.2d 1045]; see,
also, Marlenee v. Brown, 21 Cal.2d 668, 677 [134 P.2d 770];
Texas Co. v. Bank of America etc. Assn., supra, at 41; Burris
v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331, 336 (41 P. 458]; Wood v. Roach,
125 Cal.App. 631, 635 [14 P.2d 170].) Even though the

I
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'probate court exercises a particular statutory jurisdiction,
.it has many incidental powers in pursuance thereof. (See
.Bennett v. Forrest, 24 Ca1.2d 485, 491-492 [150 P.2d 416];
Dobbins v. Title Guar. ~ Trust Co., 22 Ca1.2d 64, 67-69
[136 P.2d 572).) The orders and decrees of the probate
are treated with the same dignity on appeal as any
orders and judgments of the superior courts. (Estate
Caspar, 172 Cal. 147, 149 [155 P. 631]; Estate of Snow157 Ca1. 301, 305 [107 P. 598].) A fortiori they re. '....hr.. equal treatment on certiorari. (Howard v. Superior
25 Ca1.2d 784, 788 [154 P.2d 849]; lA1ienkamp v.
'X1l11I!T1,nT Court, 14 Ca1.2d 293, 301 [93 P.2d 1008]; H eyv. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 348, 351 [49 P. 210].)
[4] Although we have found it unnecessary to look to
record for evidence in support of the probate court's findthe writ of certiorari has already issued and we have the i
~I.'ec()rd before us. It is at once apparent, upon examining
record, that the court did not enter its order without
basis. In fact, even if an appeal were possible
this case it is doubtful whether we eould, under the holdof this court governing the scope of review of decisions
upon conflicting evidence, reverse the order.
Petitioner was committed to Napa State Hospital in
1lT11nJn''V, 1946, and transferred to the
United States VetAdministration Facility in Palo Alto in March, 1946.
wife had previously been committed to a mental hosin 1940. The Anglo California Bank was appointed
uar{11an of the estates of both incompetents and, in April,
sold the home they owned in joint tenancy for
The petition for confirmation of the sale was filed
April 15, 1946. The hearing on the confirmation beon May 3, 1946, but two continuances were granted
order to afford petitioner an opportunity to appear with
.. .
and present his objections to the sale.
L. Glover, acting assistant trust officer of the bank,
. examined on behalf of the guardian. He testified, in
. as follows: "Q. Do you believe it to be to the advanand best interests of Dr. Kay's estate, and Dr. Kay, that
property be sold' A. We do." This testimony was later
repeated: "Q. As representative of the Bank,
.p~eselltirlg the Bank, they feel that the property should
~ld, that it is to the best interests of the estate, and of
meompetcntf A. Yes." Glover was also questioned

)
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with regard to the interest of petitioner's wife: "Q. You
believe it to the best interest of the incompetent and her
estate that the property be sold' A. Yes."
Glover admitted on cross-examination that no effort had
been made to lease the property. although it could readily
have been leased. He stated also that the bank had not made
inquiries of the hospital staff in order to ascertain petitioner's condition before selling the property. In fact, the
hospital staff had determined preliminarily on March 22d
that petitioner was sane and competent. Further consultations were necessary, however, and he was not discharged
as sane and competent until May 13th, after the hearing
on confirmation of sale had begun. Glover also testified that
petitioner had about eight or ten thousand dollars in securities in addition to disability payments from an insurance
policy, but that these payments would cease upon petition-I
er's recovery. According to Glover, the accepted bid constiJ
tuted the highest price obtainable for the property.
Petitioner produced two medical witnesses, one of them
from the hospita1 at Palo Alto. The latter testified that
petitioner was sane and competent and had been given a
certificate by the hospital to that effect. He was of the opinion
that all sane men are competent, thus demonstrating unfa- .
miliarity with the legal distinction between competency an
sanity (Prob. Code, § 1460), but he stated definitely tha
the hospital staff had determined that petitioner was no
only sane but competent to handle business a1fairs.
The other medical witness was also of the opinion tha
petioner was sane and competent but his opinion was quali
:fled: "Q. And what is your opinion-- A. I believe tha
he could go back to work and take care of himself and h'
property. if he doesn't go too fast and too hard. Q. Do you
think that his condition is such-in other words, would he be
able, in your opinion, to return to active practice today'
A. Today-not today, right away-I would advise that he
take quite a few months further rest before going into practice. Q. At the present time, as of today, you would say
that he is not able-- A. He might be able to get by with
it, but I would think it better for him to go slowly. Q. And
you think that he is able today to handle his business affairs,
his money, his insurance, stocks and bonds, and things of that
sort T A. That is something I would hesitate to say, because I don't know enough about those things-a man might,

.
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be quite capable of doing one thing, and his judgment might
. not be good in business matters. Q. Might it impede his
~fnrt.hler recovery if he were to be saddled down now with
JWIill\;UI.1 matters, financial worries-on the stock market, for
and the matter of handling money' A. That
add to his difficulties."
. The witness had testified earlier that the sale of petitionhome would be detrimental to him, but this opinion was
qualified on cross-examination: ceQ. I will ask you if
read this part of the Veterans Bureau report-on the
of the ease-these excerpts were, about the neighbors
,~'\4A.\.1.6 messages to the District Attorney's office relative to
:&1~;u.u,'U actions-visiting homes of neighbors throughout all
of the night-ringing doorbells-making inquiry about
"i\~DnE!rn7-a\ nine rooms of his home being strewn with
decayed food lying all about the kitchen-I call
attention to those portions of the report; you read that
you testified' A. I did. Dr. Kay [interrupting]:
is not true sir. . . . Q. When you testified on Mr. Lang's
.
attorney] question concerning the effect it would
on Dr. Kay in not moving back into this same house, did
ve in mind then the facts of the case concerning the
tselIrD.pors· actions at the time referred to f A. I was not
m,nkinLg of them particularly; I merely felt this: that any
who was moved out of his house these days, and had
:iftic~ul1~ getting another one, would not be affected favorably
much e1Iect it would have on him, or how
would do to him, I couldn't say. Q. In other words,
would say the same of any person f A. I would say the
. about anybody. Q. Sane or insane, competent or inmn~ptl~nt f A. Yes."
trial court, after hearing the evidence and the arguon behalf of petitioner, the guardian, and the purordered confirmation of the sale. Subsequent to the
of confirmation, on June 7, 1946, petitioner was reto capacity by an order of another department of the
i1t'Mn'i(lr court.
is clear even from the foregoing account of the record
the probate court had some evidence upon which to base
. finding that the sale was for the best interests of petiThe evidence shows that a good price, the best obI!"¥'IlUIC, was bid for the house and that petitioner's finances
80 secure that the court could be certain of his ability
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not even disturbed on appeal, unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. (Marcucci v. Vowinckel, 164 Cal. 693, 695
',[130 P.430].) [10] It need hardly be added that on
certiorari we do not review matters within the discretion
of the lower court. (8panach v. 8uperior Court, 4 Cal.2d
447, 450 [50 P.2d 444].)
A ward'a inability to appeal from an order confirming the
Bale of his property does not, however, leave him wholly without a remedy. The relationship of guardian and ward is a
highly fiduciary one. The conduct of a guardian is carefully
regulated both by statute and case law. (Prob. Code, § 1400.)
Were the guardian as derelict in it..~ custodianship of petitioner's estate as petitioner contends, it could be held to account in a proper proceeding brought on behalf of the ward.
Were there collusion between the guardian and the purchaser,
though there is no inkling of it in the record, petitioner could
seek redress through an action to impose a constructive trust
on his property. (See Restatement, Restitution, § 201.)
The order is aftirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J. t and

Sp~cet

J., concurred.

CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgmf'nt of aftirmanee,
and I am in full accord with the views eoxpressed in the
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor.
In view of the showing made in the trial court I cannot
see how it can possibly be said that the trial judge did not
have su1Ileient evidence before him to justify his conclusion
that the sale in question was for the best interests of the
incompetent ward in this (".&se. It is not the function of an
appellate court to weigh the evidence or to pass upon the
reasonableness of conflicting inferences which may be drawn
from the evidence even if that evidence is undisputed. Under
our syatem. of jurisprudence the weighing of the evidence
and the determination of the effect of the inferences to be
drawn therefrom is solely for the trier offaet (Estate of BriI'101, 23 0al.2d 221 [143 P.2d 6891 ; Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.s.
804 [67 S.Ct. 313, 91 L.Ed. - ] ; TenMnt v. Peoria 41
P.U.B. Co., 321 U.S. 29 [64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520]; Ell"
Y. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 329 U.S. 649 I67 S.Ct. 598, 91
L.Ed. --J; NatiMull Labor Relations Bel. v. Hearst PubliC4tilms, 322 U.S. 111 [64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170]; Com·WuioMr v. Bcotti$h Am.... Co., 323 U.s. 119 [65 S.Ct. 169,

)
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89 L.Ed. 113]; UnemploY1nent Compensation Commission v.
Aragan, 329 U.S. 143 [67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. - ] ; Cardillo
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., --U.S. [67 S.Ct. 801. 91
',L.Ed. - ] ) .
!!', The rules governing an appellate court in reviewing the
of a trial court in probate as well as other civil
""·: .•~a.'" are admirably stated by Mr. Justice Schauer in Estate
Bristol, 23 Ca1.2d 221 [143 P.2d 689], as follows:
"The rules of evidence, the weight to be accorded to the
and the province of a reviewing court, are the
w'l."ll contest as in any other civil case. (Estate of
5.1~rB01:ooa:u (1910), 157 Cal. 301, 305 [107 P. 598]; Estate of
(1924), 69 Cal.App. 16, 33 [230 P. 181].) [2] The
to our province is: 'In reviewing the evidence . . .
con:flicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and
legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold
.' verdict if possible. It is an elementary . . . principle of
-that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported,
power of the appelalte court begins and ends with a
terJrnillat:ion as to whether there is any substantial evidence,
[)nt,ra(llC1CCa or uncontradicted, which will support the conreached by the jury. When two or more inferences
be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing
is without power to substitute its deductions for those
the trial court.' (Italics added.) (Crawford v. SoutherB
Co. (1935), 3 Ca1.2d 427. 429 [45 P.2d 183].) The
quoted is as applicable in reviewing the findings of a
as it is when considering a jury's verdict. The critical
in the definition is 'substantial'; it is a door which
lead as readily to abuse as to practical or enlightened
- [3) It is common knowledge among judges and
that many cases are determined to the entire satistrial judges or juries, on their factual issues, by eviis overwhelming in its persuasive'Ress but which
lin-nUl" relatively unsubstantial---if it can be reffected at
a phonographic record. Appellate courts, therefore, if
any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evito sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor
finding; and in searching the record and exploring
inf'ereinCl:lS which may arise from what is found there, to
whether such doubt or conflict exists, the court
,be realistic and practical. Upon such view of the law
hold that any essential finding in this case is unDlKltrted.." [Emphasis added.]
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I am in full ac\!ord with the views expressed in the foregoing excerpt. These views were again restated by Mr.
Justice Schauer with exceptional force and clarity in his dissenting opinion in the case of Isenberg v. California Emp.
Stab. Com., ante, p. 34 at page 46 [180 P.2d 11], where
he said: "The functions of trial and appellate courts are
constitutionally disparate and no role should be more scrupulously observed by courts of .Appeal than that in their appellate work they should not encroach upon or usurp a
trial court function. The resolution of factual questions
including the detennination of the inferences to be drawn
from the evidence whether that evidence be documentary or
undisputed or otherwise, is in a major sense exclusively the
province of the trial court (or of th~ jury). It is exclusive
in the trial court (or jury) in the sense that the appellate
court is given no right to resolve factual conflicts or to indulge its preference as to the selection of inferences from
the evidence. It is only where clearly there is no substantial evidence from which essential inferences can be drawn
that the appellate court may properly interfere in a factual
sense; and its interference then should be· both in fonn and
in substance by a statement of the law not a declaration of
fact. Any other course by an appellate court is dictatorial
in nature and tends toward depriving litigants of the constitutional standards of a fair trial."
In the light of the foregoing pronouncements as to the
function of an appellate court in reviewing a factual determination by a trial court there can be no escape from the
conclusion reached in the majority opinion.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-uTo thus interpret law doth
cuckold justice." The "dim and odious annals of the past"
(Lytton Strachey, Elizabeth and Essex) are, indeed, come
down to date. Is an adult man who is sane and competent
in fact, who has served his country as well as his community
as a physician and surgeon, who is convicted of no crime,
who owes no debts, who has thousands of dollars of cash in
the hands of a bank which had been appointed his guardian,
who owns a house which he built on a lot which he bought
with funds which he earned, who is possessed of ample income, who needs and wishes to keep the house to use as an
office for his practice and as a home for himself and his two
young daughters, but who at one time was mentally ill for

)

ESTATE OF KAY

229

[30 C.2d 215; t8t P.2d 11

'it days, who, it is res judicata,

had recovered nnd was "sane
. and competent" at the time of the court order here involved,
h61pless to prevent a sale by his "guardian" of his property'
the shame of our system of jurisprudence the majority
this court so hold.
Willard E. Kay, a physician and surgeon, the husband
Kay and the father of Nancy Ann and Kathryn,
has honorably ministered in the armed forces as well
his civilian community, about ten years ago built Ii
at the northwest corner of Scott and Broadway in San
He built it for himself and his wife Nancy and
two young daughters. Nancy became incompetent
years ago. Dr. Kay used the house both as family
I!I!DCLen<:e and professional office. On January 14, 1946, he
adjudged mentally ill and was committed to the Napa
On January 22. 1946, the Anglo California NaBank of San Francisco was appointed guardian of his
(It also, previously, had been appointed to act a..q
of Nancy's estate.) Fifty-nine days later, on
22, 1946, the sta1f of the Veterans Administration
to which institution Dr. Kay had been transferred
20, 1946, examined him and found him "sane and
1Il1J.etlmt" This ifI not disputed. He was, nevertheless,
retained under examination. On April 6, 1946,
was again "presented . . . to the staff and at that
was also considered sane and competent; there was
,case review on May 1st, 1946 ... at which he wa..q
. considered competent, and the last review was on the
'of May, at which time he was discharged from the hos'as sane and competent." He was at that time (May
) "Discharged to his own custody" to take care of
,affairs and was given a formal certUicate of comas provided for by statute. (WeIf. & Inst. Code,
)
'to May 16, 1946, Dr Kay filed his petition for legal

timLticln to adjudicated competency. He alleged among
things that "Ever since May 1, 1946, petitioner has
and he now is sane, and competent and of sound mind,
'entitled to be restored to mental competency and
and ever since said date, he has been, and now is,
_.I"~~"V of caring for himself and of managing his
and his estate, and is entitled to an adjudication to
' . effeet." On June 7, 1946, all the above allegations were
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adjudicated to be true. Not one allegation in that ptltition
was challenged by Dr. Kay's guardian, by the trial judge,
by Mr. Edel Epstein who had n deal pending with the guardian to purchase Dr. Kay's property at private sale, or by
anyone else. Nevertheless, with thnt petition pending hearing, the trial court undertook. on l\Iay 16, 1946, to confirm
(apparently the trial judge believed that he was merely refusing to "set aside") a sale of Dr. Kay's property, over his
protests, to Mr. Epstein. The sale was confirmed for a price
of $20,200 for Dr. Kay's interest ($40,400 for the entire
property); the property had previously, by the court appraiser, been appraised at $25.000 for Dr. Kay's interest
($50,000 for the entire property). The property had not
been offered publicly or listed with any broker. It was offered
by the guardian at private sale to Mr. Epstein and the guard.ian undertook to make the sale to Mr. Epstein for $40,400
while the property stood appraised at $50,000. That sale
was undertaken by the guardian (petition for confirmation
filed) on April 15, 1946. It will be remembered that according to the undisputed evidence Dr. Kay, in the opinion
of the Veterans Administration Hospital staff, had recovered
and was "sane and competent" as early as March 22, 1946.
more than three weeks before the guardian even filed the
petition for confirmation and nearly two months before the
"confirmation." The excuse stated by the guardian for
offering to sell under the circumstances shown was that it
did not know that Dr. Kay bad recovered. Its representative admitted that no effort had been made to ascertain his
condition. Nevertheless, on May 16, 1946, assertedly under
the mistaken belief that the property had already been sold
and that it did not have the right "to set aside the sale," the
trial (probate) judge confirmed the sale. This egregious error
and failure to pursue jurisdiction, the majority hold, cannot
be rectified.
None of the essential facts are disputed. This is not a
case wherein, there being a conflict in the testimony or in the
inferences to be drawn from the testimony or documents or
! circumstances shown, it is the duty of the reviewing court
I
to sustain the inferences and conclusions of the trial court.
The holding in Estate of Bristol (1943), 23 Ca1.2d 221, 223
[143 P.2d 689], inferentially relied upon, although not cited,
in the majority opinion, has no pertinency here. That case
deals with a question as to the sufficiency of evidence; here
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!"Jr. are confronted not

merely with a paucity of evidence to

!II1PPort a finding which was made but, more particularly,
with an overwhelming, undisputed, affirmative showing that
! the act of the probate court exceeded its "defined power" as
tI,,!f(let1lD.ea by . . . express statutory declaration." ( AbeZleira
1Jifl~ncf Courl of AppeaZ (1941), 17 Ca1.2d 280, 291 [109
942, 132 A.L.R. 715].) It has frequently been held,
tilt1'iUbstmce, that if from all the facts only a single inference
one conclusion may be drawn, then such single inference
. a fact in the case and the "one conclusion" must be
p ......""'-~ as a matter of law. (Baugh v. Rogers (1944), 24 Cal.
200; 206 [148 P.2d 633, 152 A.L.R. 1043]; Perguica v.
tfitlrlus~~na' Ace. Com. (1947), 29 Cal.2d 857, 859 [179 P.2d
PieZds v. Sanders (1947), 29 Ca1.2d 834, 842-843
.2d 684]. Justice Traynor, on another occasion (MosArde~ Parms Co. (1945), 26 Cal.2d 213 [157 P.2d
A.L.R. 872], concurring opinion, p. 223) stated his
be that "[I] f reasonable men could not differ as to
. the evidence does or does not establish the existence
the court will not submit the issue to the jury.")
an'the essential facts are either undisputed or are res
Only one conclusion in respect to departure from
~risClictional procedure can be drawn by a reasonable mind.
same rule of law which was followed in the Abelleira
applied here the order rendered must be annulled.
undisputed that there was no necessity for the sale.
. was at all times concerned in receipt of a cash insome $500 or $600 a month from insurance policies
was not disputed that such income would continue as
he remained unable to carry on his practice. He had
:cJ'Qli1&D.(lS of dollars of cash on hand. It is also undisputed
was possessed of some $8,000 to $15,000 worth of
. .
securities. No cash was needed in the
the personal property securities were not offered
The real property was never offered for rent j the
.hetd it vacant.
was inco~petent for but a few weeks, or at most,
a legalistic sense, months. As previously noted the
was appointed on or about January 22, 1946. On
22, 1946, Dr. Kay was pronounced sane and compethe hospital staff; on May 13, he was discharged and
formal certificate of competency; and on June 7,
.form&lly, adjudged that he was then, and at all times
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subsequent to May 1, 1946, had been, llsane, competent and
of sound mind and . . . entitled to be restored to mental competency and ever since said date, he has been, and now is,
fully capable ... of managing his dam and his estate."
In apparent haste to sell Dr. Kay's property before he was
fully restored to legal competency, the petition for confirmation was flIed April 15, 1946, without consulting him and
without inquiry as to his then condition of health. The petition alleges, among other things, that "the interest of this
estate in said parcel has been appraised at $25,000.00, but
your petitioner is informed and believes, and therefore al- i
leges, that said appraisement is too high, and therefore re- I
spectfully requests that a new appraisement be forthwith I
had. (6) That said sale was made directly with said purchaser [Edel R. Epstein] without the employment or assistance of any broker or agent and no real estate broker's commission is payable." Such petition was set for hearing on
May 3, 1946. This was some six weeks after Dr. Kay had been
found sane and competent by the staff at the Veterans Administration Hospital but while he was still under observation there. On that day a telegram which had been received
by the clerk of the court on the preceding day, was called to
the attention of the trial judge. The telegram purported to
come from the brother-in-law of Dr. Kay and read as follows: "Dr. Kay's home is not to be sold or sale confirmed
in court without his personal consent. Arrangements were
made for his release on May 1st from Veterans Hospital.
Mrs. Kay may arrive A-fay 2nd. Dr. Kay's condition was
only temporary and not permanent and is well now. They
must be allowed to occupy the house and sale must not be
confirmed until and unless Dr. Kay consents to it. Meanwhile confirmation can be continued two or three weeks or
a month." The trial judge remarked, "I really see no reason
why this matter should be postponed. I can't pay any attention to telegrams from somebody that knows nothing about
the circumstances, or from relatives. . . . We cannot be postponing these sales for trivial matters . . . I understand Dr.
Kay was-before Dr. Kay was committed, the whole neigh.
borhood was out hiring attorneys-he was firing shots through
the ceiling-isn't that true T [The record before us is devoid
of evidence to this effect.] •.. This incompetency has been
going on for a long time, hasn't itt" "Mr. Herrington: Not
Dr. Kay-it is only three or four months old." "The Court:
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, WeD, that Us some time.

.•." The matter was, however, conKay and hUs coun, eel appeared and opposed the eonfirmation of sale. Among
" Other things stated to the court the following appears: "Dr.
Xq, who Us one of the incompetents here, Us in court, as
.' . Honor &aid. We have been informed by the medical
or by a member of the medical staff, of the Veterans
~;~lDWllistJratil[)n Hospital in Palo Alto, that Dr. Kay should
.'.reat;ored, and that he Us no longer incompetent, and that
riJ_l8dings should be commeneed for the purpose of having
eoJI1J)81ten4yY adjudicated, and having him restored.
are
on behalf of Dr. Kay for a continuance
matter, and that the sale either not be confirmed or
.be continued for a suftleient period of time to eMble
"ftC:otIlDUS,..J to 1uwe 0,.. opporlu.ifll 10 be restored.
The reason· thUs request Us made Us because
and he has no plaee to go and live and have
_', ~'_... since he is a practieing physieian-he was before
an ineompetent--and he asks the Court
.
."~ntil!1ue. the matter, or to diaapprove the sale for that
We believe that it Us within the Court's discretion
that, to enable him to save his home. Legally, he is in.:nJ)4iJte11t and inSane today, but in a few days, from the
~~o.nnation that we have, he will be declared competent.•••"
CoUrt: . . • I think the only thing I can do, to pre11&8 rigAf' 01 Mr. CuZZiMfto OM Ail clie.fa [the Epsteins]
an., they have some rights-thia sale is legitimate, in
the natural sentiment we have about taking a home
I think a few days' continuance should be
~ . " •. And I want a substantial showing at that time. ~t to hear what Us going to be done, and all that;
some substantial showing at that time." (Italics
There Us in the record not the slightest basis for
either the prospective purchasers or their attaraD.,. "rights" in the premises ,to be "preserved."
Dr. Kay and his wife, Nancy, who had rights which
have been the primary coneem of the court and

dnued uDtil Yay 10, and at that time Dr.

16, the hearing resumed. At that time it appeared
only had Dr. Kay been released from the hospital
'restonld to sanity and competency in the opinion of the
.staff, but that he had filed a petition for restoration
court to fulllepl competency and that heariDc OIl
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such petition had been set for June 6, only some three weeks
away. The petition averred that petitioner was in fact sane
and competent as of the date of its filing and that he had
been sane and competent "ever since May 1, 1946." As previously noted none of its allegations was challenged by anyone and on June 7, they were adjudicated true.
The evidence upon which the majority rely to support the
jurisdiction of the trial court in its purported confirmation
of the sale-actually, its denial of rescission-is that of one
Myron L. Glover, an employee of the trust department of the
guardi:m bank. In response to leading questions he undertook to state the naked belief and feeling, not his personal
opinion, of his corporate employer as to the advantage to Dr.
Kay and his estate of making the sale in qUeGion. He gave
no reason, whatsoever, for the "belief" or "feeling" of the
bank except the indicated basic belief that Dr. Kay was insane and incompetent and would remain so indefinitely. The
transcript shows: "Q. Do you believe it to be to the advan. tage and best interest of Dr. Kay's estate, and Dr. Kay, tbt
the property be sold' A- We do. . . . Q. As representative
of the Bank, representing the Bank, they feel that the property should be sold, that it is to the best interest of the estate,
and of the incompetenU A. Yes. . . . Q. (Mr. Lang) I will ask
you if you made any investigation or caused any investigation
to be made as to the possible recovery of Dr. Kay on or before
April 15, 1946 [the date the petition for confirmation was
med] , • _ . A. No. Q. Did you have any reason to make
any investigation at that time f Had anyone informed you
that Dr. Kay had made any application for restoration' ANo. If there had been, we would h.ave made no effort to selZ
the property. Q. You did not know that he was found to be
sane and competent by the medical staff on March 22' . . •
A. No, we had no knowledge!' (Italics added.)
It is thus obvious that the "belief" of the bank clerk as
to the "feeling" of the bank was based on the further erroneous belief that Dr. Kay continued insane and incompetent
when in fact he had recovered. The attitude of the bank on
the final hearing (May 16, 1946) in relation to the question
of Dr. Kay's restoration to legal competency, is reflected by
the following passage from the transcript: "[By Mr. Herrington.] Mr. Cullinan is here representing the purchasers,
and Mr. Lang is also here, and I think your Honor has the
I picture in mind from last week. AI far as the petition for
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1 might say that the Bank's position on that is
neutral' if the doctor can establish that he has recovered
and is ~tit1ed to handle his own affairs, the Bank will be
'Qm1 too happy to cooperate and abide by any order the
'Court may make in that connection. We do not expect to
f1uJf at all." (Italics added.} But the effort to con"ftmi the sale went on.
"! BVidence was introduced which, without any substantial
. .
established that Dr. Kay had in fact largely recovered
and strength, that he was then sane and competent
.ShoUld avoid overworking and worry for some months.
undisputed that he had been released; as restored. to
'r~:"f+.... and competency, to return to his own home, that he
able to resume to some extent his practice of medicine,
................. he needed and wanted his home place in which to
and maintain his family and his omce. The property
kept vacant during the months that Dr. Kay had
in the hospital and, upon Dr. Kay's recovery and restorahis guardian refused to allow him to enter it.
. is to be remembered that we are here concerned' with
gUJl\rdlaIlSbllp matter and with the limited power of the
sitting
probate, in a special statutory proceeding•
. C&IlI8 in modern legal literature, in California or else;:I!~\~.~".,.';;which indulges hyper-technicality to a similar end
'. ,~, the extent of the majority opinion in this ease, has
'cited. Section 785 (Prob. Code) declares that "Upon
.
the court must examine into the necessity for the
the advantage, benefit and interest of the estate in
·the sale made, and mud examine the return and wit. in relation to the sale. . . . " (Italics added.) In
tbau'!it'tl' Yo District Court of AppeaZ (1941), IUpra. 17 Cal.
this court said; "The concept of jurisdiction
number of ideas of similar character, some
~~ltal to the nature of any judicial system, some de.'the requirement of due process,. some determined
. ~nstitutional or statutory structure of a particular
some based upon mere procedural rules originally
for convenience and efficiency, and by precedent made
aneJatc)ry and jurisdictional. Speaking generally, any acts
exceed the defined power of a court in any instance,
D41tJlEIl' that power be defined by constitutional provision,
statutory declaration, or rules developed by the
and followed nnder the doetrine of stare decisis, nre
,01. ~etloD, ~ 10 f~ as tba.t . . . II· ......

. 'c,ppo8e
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indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibition
or annulled on cert·iora,.i."
It is Hornbrook law that the jurisdiction of a probate court,
as such, is limited and special. (Olcese v. Superior Court,
(1930), 210 Cal. 556, 568 [292 P. 964]; Haynes v. Meeks
(1862),20 Cal. 288, 312, 314; Janes v. Throckmorton (1881),
57 Cal. 368, 387; 21 Am.Jur. § 582, p 709. See, also, Estate
of Davis (1902), 136 Cal. 590, 597 [69 P. 412]; McPike v.
Superior Court (1934), 220 Cal. 354, 258 [30 P.2d 17];
Texas Co. v. Bank of America (1935), 5 Cal.2d 35, 39 [53
P.2d 127].) In Rodman v. Superior Court (1939), 13 Ca1.2d
262, at 269 [89 P.2d 109], this court said: "An examination
of the numerous cases which deal with this problem impels
the conclusion that some confusion exists with reference to
what constitutes an excess, and what constitutes an error, in
the exercise of jurisdiction. However, it seems well settled
(and there appears to be no ease holding to the contrary)
that when a statute authorizes prescribed procedure, and the
court acts contrary to the authority thlUl conferred, it ha..~
exceeded its jurisdiction, and certiorari will lie to correct
such excess." See, also, Spreckels S. Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Com. (1921),186 Cal. 256, 260 fI99 P. 8]. There is no appeal.
in a guardianship proceeding, from an order confinning a
sale of property. (Guardianship of Reser (1943), 57C81.
App.2d 935. 936 [135 P.2d 709].)
The trial court. seeming to be of the view that the pur.
chaser acquired vested rights as of the date of his bid and
that those "rights" must prevail unless and until Dr. Kay
proved some "grounds" for rescinding or "setting aside the
sale," placed the burden on Dr. Kay to prove- grounds
for "setting aside the sale," rather than on the guardian or
Mr. Epstein to prove existence of jurisdictiona] facts necessary to warrant confirming the projected sale. The court
further held that the recovery of sanity and competency by
Dr. Kay was not a sufticient ground for "setting aside the
sale," that the sale could not be set aside or confirmation
I
withheld "for the grounds that we have heard here today"
/ and concluded the hearing with these words: "I think the
showing here is absolutely insufticient. I have heard all this
evidence here today just fo accommodate those who came
here, and to give everyone a hearing-l do not think it
6fJects the iuues of the case af all. The order is that this
sa]e is confirmed." (Italics added.)
Regardless, therefore, of the sufliciency of the evidence
'otherwis8 to show jurisdiction to confirm the sale, it 1Dl-

l
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uiistakably appears that the probate court in ordering that
"this sale is confirmed" was not actually complying, in any
aense. with section 785 of the Probate Code but was holding
merely that as a matter of law the recovery of Dr. Kay was
tDiumcient to constitute, and wholly immaterial as, a ground
, .' "setting aside" the sale which, in its conception, had
alieac:l, been made by the guardian to Mr. Epstein. As re~IIoWIAq indicated by the trial judge he was concerning himnot with a diligent inquiry into the best interests of Dr.
and his estate, as the statute requires, but rather with
.·lUIotelrtiIlg the "rights" of those whom he considered already
purchasers. He said. "I think the only thing I can do,
.<;+1\'··'''....,'''''...,171'1 the rights of Mr. Cullinan and his clients [Mr. and
~........... li'!!ft...·...... -after all, they have some rights-this sale
le.z:itiInate, in spite of the natural sentiment we have about
home from somebody. I think a few days' con::Wl'\mnce could be granted: and . . . I don't want any of
certificates that I get here, they are of very little weight.
anybody is likely to be deprived of his rights, that is
pOEBtl()n that this court is going to take.... MR. HEIuuNoDoes your Honor care to appoint doctors' THE COURT:
is nothing before the court now. This is a case where
these parties were committed. . . . At the time this
s1£l)m1~ffe:d for sale was there any question then about his
tijtm,<l1D for recovery here' ..." (Italics added.)
representative then testified that at the time the
.• was otfered by the bank to Mr. Epstein, the bank
know that Dr. Kay had recovered his reason. The
then appears: ceQ. [by MR. LANG] I will ask you
any investigation or caused any investigation
as to the possible recovery of Dr. Kay on or be15, 1946' MR. IIEruuNGTON: I will object to the
,on the ground-- THE CoURT: Do you think that
duty of the Bank-before con1irmation of a saleshould go-when a man is in snme institution, and
regularly committed-that it is the ituty of any
,go, before property is otfered for sale, and find out
there is a possibility that this man may be restored
,00IU.D4~tel1Cv; is that your question' 1m LANG: Yes, your
in view of the fact that it is home and his castle.
...""'Vl.... : That is not the point at aU here-I do not want
'this sentiment in this case about a man's home being
[.ealrue-lve had all that up here before. Let us get down
.' legal points. ••• I am giving a great deal of time •
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this case-this type of testimony would be appropriate on
an application for restoration, which is not before the Court
at all at this time [it was filed and pending, awaiting hearing], but I did not want these doctors to come up here without hearing them. Of course, they have not impressed me
that much on the issue here, which is the question of thi~
confirmation of sale-that is the issue. MR. LANG: The whole
question is whether the sale would be detrimental-I intimated or suggested that it would seem to me the fair thing
to do would be tolease this property out. THE COURT: What
about all the legal steps that have been taken here' The sale
was advertised; the bids were received; the Court called for
further bids-all of those things have been done. I just went
out of my way to do what I suppose I had no authority to do,
over Mr. Cullinan's objection here, to go into this matter;
and upon your personal request to me the other day-you
told me you had been retained in the case; but whether those
things affect the L'!Sue here is another question.... MR. HERRINGTON: ... The question seems to be: is this sale, as it now
stands, for the advantage, benefit, and best interest of Dr.
Kay' MR. LANG: That is the whole question. It has been '
my procedure, or at least it has been the custom of myself
and the Bank of America or the Anglo California BankI can't say the Anglo California-to make an investigation
before going into a matter like this. THE COURT: I never
heard of such a cmtom. . . . MR. CULLINAN: There is not
much for me to say in addition to what I have already said
at previous hearings-this is a difficult time for purchasers to
find places, and when they find a place and put a lot of money
and obligate themselves for the title search and make arrangements for contractors, painters, and other trades to
fix the place up-- MR. LANG: You know, Mr. Cullinan, don't
you, that all sales are subject to the confirmation of the Court'
THE COURT: But not for the grounds that we have heard
here today . ... I think the showing here is absolutely in.su.fficient. I have heard all this e1Jidence here today just to accommodate those who came here, and to give everyone a
hearing-l do not think it affects the issues of the case at all.
The order is that this sale is confirmed." (Italics added.)
It is manifest from the record hereinabove quoted that
the trial judge did not comply with the procedure prescribed
by section 785 of the Probate Code and that he wholly ignored
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aecnon 40 of the Civil Code.· He made no pretense of examining "into the necessity for the sale, or the advantage, benefit
and interest of the estate in having the sale made" in relation to the interest of Dr. Kay as a living competent person,
or in relation to the "sale" as a mere contemplated or pro'posed, rather than a consummated project. He considered
. that the sale had already been made; that the purchaser had
}~rights" which it was the court's duty to "preserve"; that
E,,;the proceeding was one whereby Dr. Kay sought to "set
. !aside" the sale; and that he was passing on the legal suffiof grounds for "setting aside the sale." He held
grounds insufficient as a matter of law to "set aside
sale"; he did not comply with section 785 of the Probate
; and the order sought to be annulled is not in actuality
which the court in this proceeding had jurisdiction
• It,is unmistakably an order denying rescission of
: court denominated a "legitimate" sale.
course. under our procedure a sale is not made until
,.
(Estate of Rule (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 1, 10 [152
1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319].) Mr. Epstein had not bought
'K:&y's property; he had merely offered to buy it. The
i!'·....DW~. did not have before it, and did not have jurisdiction
'pass upon, any issue 88 to rescission or "Retting aside"
,~' otherwise binding sale. Yet it did not assume to pass
any other issue. (Whether mandate should issue, upon
. application, to require the court to exercise the jurisgiven it by section 785 of the Probate Code, is not
us.) It is obvious that the court did not follow the
_dUl~' prescribed by section 785 of the Probate Code;
Ant:A1"f1lt no order whatsoever based on that procedure;
a settlement of issues projected by that statute;
the order it did enter, by which it undertook to deny
IlCissi()D or "setting aside" of what it erroneously conbe an accomplished sale, iswholJy void. AB such. it
annuned.
"~5id8iJ.Y

"

the Civil Code provides that "After his incapacity has
determined, a persoD of unsound mind can make no
other contract ... until his restoration to capacity. But
from the l!'-edical superintendent or resident physician of
to which such person may have been committed, showleD. person had been discharged therefrom, cured and restored
shall eetablish the presumption of legal capacity in such pertime of such discharge." Here Dr. Kay had been released
competent"; he had been provided with the formal caniil·
AJ>i8cJ:l.&J'lle of InAne Person as Recovered" and the document

